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ABSTRACT
In the standard model of labor supply, each worker is a price taker,
where the relevant price is an hourly wage rate which is fixed in the
short run, and which does not depend upon the number of hours supplied.
With this basic assumption, the wage can be regarded as exogenous for the
purpose of estimating a labor supply function. This paper proposes and
implements a pair of tests for the exogeneity of wages in a longitudinal
labor supply model, and for the particular failure of exogeneity associated
with jobs that offer wage—hour packages.
The first test is very simple——it amounts to a test of whether hours
Granger—cause wages at the individual level. The second test involves a
simultaneous estimation of labor supply and wage offer equations. Both
tests indicate that the offered wage is related to hours worked, though the
offer locus is, for this sample, very flat. The principal conclusion is
that labor supply equations cannot properly be estimated in isolation from
the process generating wages, even when long time series are available
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I. Introduction
In the standard model of labor supply, each worker is a price taker. The
relevant price for each individual is an hourly wage rate which is fixed in
the short run, and which does not depend upon the number of hours supplied.
With this basic assumption, the wage can be regarded as exogenous for the
purpose of estimating a labor supply function, and the process by which wages
are determined need not be specified. This paper proposes and implements a
test for the exogeneity of wages, and for the particular failure of exogeneity
associated with jobs that offer wage—hour packages.
With cross—sectional data, wage exogeneity is not a plausible assumption
and is seldom invoked as such. In the long run, individuals may influence
their own earning power via investment in human capital. Thus the wage in a
cross—section labor supply equation is likely to be correlated with the
stochastic term due to unobserved tastes and abilities which have helped to
determine the wage, as well as current labor supply. A longitudinal analysis,
in which wages and hours are observed for the same sample over a number of
time periods, can avoid the resulting simultaneity bias by eliminating
individual coustants in the labor supply equation. As long as wages are
exogenous to the individual in the short run, we can proceed to estimate labor
supply functions using the "within" variation in wages and hours.
This requirement may not be met if the wage is part of a 'package deal'
associated with a particular job. Most jobs appear to permit very limited2
variation in hours worked at the discretion of the employee (though
absenteeism may generate some short—run flexibility). This suggests that
fixed hours per week may be part of a package which includes the wage rate and
other working conditions, but labor supply analysis need not change as long as
there is no systematic relationship between hours and wages. If a continuum
of hours are offered by firms, each worker simply chooses a job which imposes
desired hours. However, if market equilibrium generates a locus of wage/hours
combinations representing different jobs, each individual must optimize
subject to this constratht, and the wage will be endogenous. At present we
have little evidence regarding the existence, or the shape, of such a locus.
Previous studies have relied upon cross—section wage equations, in which the
simultaneity of wages and hours is likely to be a problem if preferences are
heterogeneous.
1
The manner in which such a choice set may be established will not be
analyzed here. Suffice it to say that employers may wish to make tied offers
of hourly wage and work week if production or other costs vary with shift
length or with days worked. Such cost differences could arise from fixed
costs of shift changeover, hiring and training, or from a non—constant
marginal product as an individual worker puts in more hours perweek.2 The
wage will be endogenous whenever the slope of the wage—hoursoffer locus is
non—zero.
1 H. Rosen (1976) estimated a sizable positive relationship between wages and
hours for married women, while Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981) found that wages
are negatively related to expected hours per year for stably employedwhite
men. Ehrenberg and Schumann (1981) conclude that, on average,workers do not
receive higher straight—time wages for mandatory overtime.
2 Marketequilibria in which jobs have multiple characteristics are analyzed
by S. Rosen (1974) and by Lewis (1969), who suggested that a"market
equalizing wage curve" is likely to be associated with variation in hours
worked. Also see Penman for a survey of work on the standard 40—hour week.3
This paper devises a pair of tests for a non—horizontal wage—hours offer
locus using monthly longitudinal data on a sample of married men. The first
test is very simple —itamounts to a test of whether hours Granger—cause
wages at the individual level. The second test involves a simultaneous
estimation of labor supply and wage offer equations, with all variables
expressed as deviations from individual means of a three—year time series.
Both tests provide evidence for the existence of tied wage—hours offers,
though the second indicates that the offer locus is, for this sample, very
flat.4
II. Labor Supply and Wage Offers for an Individual
Let each individual i solve in period t the following maximization
problem:
max Ui(YjujXj) subject to WjHi
where Y is income, W is the hourly wage rate, and H is hours worked. X is a
vector of exogenous variables which affect the supply price of labor,such as
age and number of children. If the wageis exogenous, we can specify a labor
supply function Hith(a.
where aj is an individual effect which
is constant over time.3 Since a is unobservable and is likely tobe
correlated with W, longitudinal data is required to estimate this labor
supply function. With a simple linear specification of h(.), we cantake
deviations from individual means, and the fixed effect a1 will drop out.
To introduce tied wage—hours offers, we assume that the wage faced by
person I in period t Is generated by:
(1) Wit =d1+ + uit
The wage is a linear function of hours worked, a fixed individual effect, and
a random shift parameter. Corresponding to the wage offerschedule is a
"marginal wage income" schedule with slope 2f, as shown in Figure1. This
shows the effective tradeoff between leisure and income faced by the worker,
A similar labor supply function would result from an intertemporal problem
in which the individual faces a lifetime budget constraint. Additive
intertemporal preferences must be assumed, however, since there is nodirect
dependence of labor supply on wages in other periods, except as theyenter
through ai.5
and is analogous to the marginal revenue function of the monopolist.
This is clearly a spot—market specification of hours and wages; multi—
period employment contracts introduce a significant complication. In the
extreme case where the wage is simply "an installment payment on the firm's
long—term obligation to the worker" (Hall, 1980), the current wage need not
respond to current hours at all.4
Figure 1
With tied offers, hours worked will be a function of the parameters of
the wage—hours offer locus. Assume, for simplicity, that the marginal rate of
substitution between income and leisure (MRS in Figure 1) is linear in hours
worked. A worker who may choose any wage—hours package from the offer locus
will set hours so that marginal wage income is equal to the marginal rate of
Kennan (1983) includes a "wage smoothing" specification in his analysis
of aggregate employment—wage movements. Abowd and Card (1983) interpret





substitution. Solving for equilibrium hours as a function of the shift in the
offer locus, we have
(2) 11i + 8—2f )ui + yX + v1
where incorporates d, as well as differences in preferences and lifetime
budget constraints,is the coefficient on hours in the MRS and all other
parameters may also be functions of f. An individual equilibrium at finite
hours requires that the slope of the MRS be greater than the slope of the
marginal wage income schedule, or > 2f
Taking deviations from the individual means of a time—series on a cross—
section, (1) and (2) become
(3) hit =3—2f)ui ÷ +
(4) witfhi + Uit
so that and di disappear.
Substituting in for u in (3) gives a final system of (4) and
(5) hit =bwi+ cx + ej
where b =1/(—f),c =— 2f)/(—f),and (8 —2f)2/(8—f)2
Equation (5) is the "hours function" in Figure 2, which traces out equilibrium
wage—hours packages as the offer locus shifts over time.7
Some obvious generalizations of this hours equation and their implications for
the identification of the model will be discussed in section 4. The linearity
assumption, however, will be maintained throughout.
The absence of tied wage—hours offers corresponds to the restriction
f=O. If hours do not enter the wage equation, then the individual faces a
perfectly elastic demand curve for hours worked and (5) is an ordinary labor
supply equation. In this case, the parameter b is equal to 1/s, and a
consistent estimate can be acquired without estimation of the wage offer
equation.
If the restriction f =0holds, can we say that wages are exogenous?
Employing the concept of weak exogeneity set Out by Engle, Hendry, and Richard
(1983), wages are weakly exogenous to hours with respect to the parameter b







the wage equation. Wage exogeneity, in this sense, is more restrictive than
the absence of tied offers, since consistency requires that the shocks eit and
Uit be uncorrelated as well asf0.
Estimation of the wage—offer equation (4) depends upon the vector x.
Candidates for exogenous shifters of the labor supply schedule are somewhat
limited, since all characteristics which do not vary for an individual over
the sample period will have been included in the fixed effect. In most
samples, income from non—labor sources and number of children are the only
observable possibilities for x.
In fact, however, the behavior of the errors e and u provides an
alternative method of identification. Both h and w exhibit strong serial
correlation, a pattern which can be interpreted as the result of shocks to the
individual's supply price, or to their offered wage schedule, which are






Wit= fhit+ q(wj_1 —fhjt_i)+
It is assumed, for the remainder of the paper, that e and u are not causally
related, though the innovations c and i may be correlated.9
III. Do Hours Cause Wages?
Equations (6—7) suggest a very simple and very general test for tied
wage—hours offers. The reduced form of the wage equation is,
w1 =f(bwit+ p(hi_i —bwfti +e) + q(w11 —fhi1)+
If f=O, then the current wage depends only upon past wages and the innovation
If f0 ,thenpast hours should help to predict the current wage.
Thus the presence of tied offers implies that hours cause wages, where
causality is of the type described by Granger (1969).
"...We say that is causing X if we are better able to
predict X using all available [past] information than if the
information apart from [past] Y had been used" (p. 428),
The tests reported here are similar to those employed by Sargent
(1976). The restriction f =0implies that E(wjtwi...i)E(witIwjt_i,hi_i),
which must hold if hours do not Granger—cause wages. A failure of the
necessary condition for non—causality will thus imply the presence of tied
offers in this case. This result will generalize to higher order
autocorrelation of the demand and supply shocks, so an ordinary least squares
regression of wages on lagged hours and lagged wages provides the basis of the
first test. Note that the validity of this test does not depend at all upon
the specification of the labor supply function.
This regression employed 48 months of wage and hours data from a
longitudinal sample of low—income married men in the control group of the
Denver Income Maintenance Experiment. From the set of 580 who reported10
employment information for the duration of the experiment, a subsample was
chosen who reported positive hours worked in each month. This left 204 men
between the ages of 18 and 58, who earned an average hourly wage below $4.00
(1972 dollars) but experienced reasonably stable employment. Deviations from
individual means were calculated for monthly hours adjusted for seasonal
variations, and for the straight—time hourly wage deflated by the Denver CPI
and seasonally adjusted. The last 36 months of data were employed to allow
for 12 monthly lags.5
Lagged hours are highly significant in the wage equations for both the
full sample and the subsample of job changers. We can thus reject the
exclusion of lagged hours, and reject Granger non—causality of wages by
hours. This test provides some evidence that tied wage—hours offers are being
faced by the men in this sample. A symmetric test for wages causing hours
leads to the expected conclusion that lagged wages do help to predict current
hours •6
This lag length was chosen arbitrarily. A four month lag was attempted
later, but this did not affect the results. It was hopedthat 12 months would
be sufficiently long that no omitted lags would be included in the error term.
In fact, there is no evidence of autocorrelation in the residuals.Estimation
of partial correlation functions (for up to six lags) yields no significant
coefficients, and the Q statistic from the sample autocovariancesfor lags one
through six is 6.26, which is x(6) and insignificant.
6 An alternative test for Granger—causalitY has been employed by Sims (1972)
and others. In this context, it consists of regressing hours on past,
current, and future values of the wage, and testingfor the significance of
future wages. This test was also implemented, using eight pastand four
future lags. Future wages were significant in the hours equation, confirming
the above result that hours Grangercause wages.11
TABLE 1
F—Tests on Twelve Lagged Months
F—ratio
Hours in wage equation 2.88
Wages in hours equation 3.50
Critical value for F99(12, ) 2.18
It is perhaps worth noting that this causality test would fail if the
innovations in the wage—offer and hours equations followed very similar serial
correlation patterns. If p =q,then lagged hours will have a coefficient of
zero in the wage equation even iff * 0.12
LV.SimultaneousEstimation
Since the presence of tied wage—hours offers cannot be dismissed on the
basis of a causality test, we now investigate the slope of the offer locus
through a simultaneous estimation of the wage and hours equation. In OLS
regressions similar to those reported in the previous section, variables which
were expected to affect the supply price of labor only and thus identify the
wage offer equation, such as non—labor income, did not have a significant
impact on hours. Similarly, the unemployment rate in Denver should have been
included in the offer equation, but displayed very little variation over the
sample period (1972—1974).
However, with first order autocorrelation specified for both e and u, the
system (6—7) is just identified —thefour reduced form parameters can be
translated into the four structural parameters through non—linear
restrictions. Unfortunately, the supply and demand equations are symmetric
and, as Kennan (1983) notes with respect to a similar structure in an
aggregate model, we cannot tell which parameters belong to the wage offer
locus and which to the labor supply function, though all are identified.
However, we can assume a priori that the slope of the offer locus is less than
the slope of the labor supply function, since this is implied by the
restriction that the slope of the marginal wage income schedule be less than
the slope of the MRS.
In practice, a fourth order autocorrelation scheme is specified for both
equations,so that the system is overidentified. Full—information maximum
likelihood was used to estimate the parameters of the two equations. This
method will generate consistent and efficient estimates if the innovations13
c and iarenormally distributed.7 Fourth order autocorrelation of the
errors e and u cannot be rejected as a restriction on a twelfth order process,
so only results from the former are reported. The wage data are in dollars
per hour and represent the regular straight—time wages only, not overtime
payments. Hours are hours per month, adjusted for seasonal variations. All
observations are again deviations from individual means, and 36 observations
for each individual in the sample are used. The standard deviation of monthly
hours is 20.5 hours, and of wages, $0.51 per hour.
The final results, with standard errors in parentheses, follow.
Labor supply:
hitl9.3O25*w1 +O.4813*ejt_l+0.1029*ej2 +O.O469*ejt3




w1 0.0024*hjt +O•5604*Uit 1+Ol34l*Ujt2 + O.O495*Ui3




s = 338.998 —3.308 N =7344
0.129
1.1
7SeeAxnemiya (1977). Non—linear two—stage least squares produced very similar
results.14
The estimated slope8 of both the labor supply function and the wage offer
locus are positive and significantly different from zero. In particular, the
estimate of f (the coefficient on hours in the wage offer equation) is very
precisely estimated, though very small. These results suggest that
individuals face, in the short run, a slightly upward—sloping choice locus of
wage—hours combinations, even when overtime rates are ignored.
The labor supply response is similar to that found in other longitudinal
studies (see, for example, MaCurdy).8 One dollar per hour yields
approximately 4.5 extra hours of work per week, a mean elasticityof about
O.4O. The offer curve, however, is extremely flat; the same 4.5 extra hours
per week will yield only 4.6 cents per hour, giveor take .4 cents. The
random components of the supply and demand curves have a contemporary
covariance which is significantly negative.
Since the model estimated here is overidentif led, it may be useful to
consider which of the many possible generalizations will still permit
identification of the wage—hours offer locus. The current restrictions placed
on the labor supply function are perhaps mostdifficult to justify. With
intertemporal substitution of leisure, a direct dependenceof current hours on
lagged hours would be introduced and, if expectations regardinglifetime
8 Recall that the hours equation is not a proper labor supply function. From
equation (5), the coefficient on wages is b — , where4isthe labor
supply response to a shift in the wage offer locus.Since the estimated value
of f is so small, however, b is very close to 4.
Meanhours per month are 181.6, mean wages $3.78.15
income respond to realized wages, current hoursmaydependupon lagged
innovations in the offer locus as well. Witha labor supply function of the
form:
hj biwj +b2w1+ b3h11+ ej
the parameters b1—b3 will not be identified.However, if the simple structure
of the wage—offer locus is maintained, its serialcorrelation structure, as
well as the parameter f which indicated thepresence of tied offers, will be
identified. The type of test performed in thissection, therefore, will be
valid for more general specifications of laborsupply.16
V. Conclusion
The two tests reported in this paper decisively rejectthe proposition
that wage rates available to an individual in the short run are exogenouswith
respect to hours worked. Both indicatethat the offered wage is related to
hours worked —thisIs interpreted here as evidence of job "packages" in
which wage and hours are tied together. The second testindicates that the
two are positively related, even when overtime rates arenot included, but
that most of the positive covariance between hoursand wages is due to supply
response, not to tied offers.
The principal conclusion is that labor supply equationscannot properly
be estimated in isolation from the process generating wages,even in the ideal
situation where long time series are available on a sampleof individuals.
The negative correlation between innovations in thedemand and supply
equations and the presence of tied wage—hoursoffers insures that an estimate
of the wage elasticity of labor supply willfail to be unbiased. The
quantitative results, particularly thesize of the straight—time wage premium
f or extra hours, should be regarded as representativeof this sample only.
Both tests, however, can be easily applied to longitudinaldata on other types
of workers.17
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